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ABSTRACT
In 1778, during the early days of the Franco-American alliance, a Boston mob
killed the Chevalier de Saint-Sauveur, a high-ranking French officer, jeopardizing the
two countries’ partnership just as soon as it began. American and French leadership alike
quickly went to work in transforming the story of Saint-Sauveur’s death from one of antiCatholic sentiment into one that demonstrated the urgency for unity and cohesion.
Through the promise of a monument, his death became a teachable moment, signifying
the fragility of the alliance and the importance of cooperation on both martial and civic
levels.
By the time of the Great War (1914-1918), when Boston elites finally constructed
the promised monument, its purpose had in some ways transformed. No longer just meant
to tell Bostonians that they should not oppose the French, the speakers at the monument’s
dedication expressed their hope that the obelisk could help show Bostonians not just to
tolerate the French, but to love them. Still, it was not as much the accuracy of their story
that they cared about, but the utility of it. The monument’s construction and unveiling
became a way for the Boston elite to reforge the city’s memory of the alliance and
demonstrate their dedication to fulfilling America’s historical debt to France. Among an
Irish populace that was particularly hostile to Britain, emphasizing the French was an
integral part of the Brahmins’ strategy to win support for the war effort.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In Paris on May 30th, 1916, a crowd of American transplants and French people met in a
small square in celebration of Decoration Day, or what the United States would later call
Memorial Day. The well-wishers gathered around a statue of George Washington and the
Marquis de Lafayette shaking hands. Sculpted by none other than Frédéric Auguste
Bartholdi, creator of the Statue of Liberty, it was a firm and resolute symbol of the
Franco-American alliance. There in the fittingly named Place des États-Unis, they
celebrated those Americans who had volunteered to fight in the war at a time when their
government refused to. Part true earnestness in honoring the American volunteers in the
Lafayette Escadrille and French Foreign Legion and part a move to court the hesitant US
government into an alliance, Decoration Day attendees laid flowers on the statue and
gave speeches, recalling how the French had come to America’s aid during the American
Revolution.
There was one notable American volunteer that was absent, however: Alan
Seeger. An American poet and member of the Foreign Legion, Seeger intended to read
his own original piece at the ceremony, but could not take leave from his military service
to join the celebration.1 Still, we can imagine Seeger, a lanky and prematurely gray 28year-old, whose expressionless and pensive demeanor gave off the vibe of a medieval
1

Chris Dickson, A Rendezvous with Death: Alan Seeger in Poetry, at War (Wickford, RI: New Street
Communications, 2017); Michael Hill, War Poet, The Life of Alan Seeger and his Rendezvous with Death
(North Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing, 2017).

1

monk, sharing his poem with the crowd. Speaking about those American volunteers who
had already died for France’s cause in the Great War, Seeger mused, “some there were /
Who, not unmindful of the antique debt, / Came back the generous path of Lafayette.”2
Here, like many before him and many after him, Seeger seized upon the legacy of
the American Revolution in order to substantiate his claim that Americans ought to
support France in her hour of peril. Lafayette, and the French forces of the American
Revolution more generally, had helped the Patriots create a new nation. Now, in the
midst of the Great War 140 years later, the French were calling to collect.3 Cognizant of
Americans’ sense of honor in trying to repay that debt, Seeger concluded his poem,
“Hail, brothers, and farewell; you are twice blest, brave hearts. / Double your glory is
who perished thus, / For you have died for France and vindicated us.”4 Little did Seeger
know when he set his pen down, however, that less than two months later he would win
his own double glory when he died on July 4th at the Battle of the Somme. Fittingly, the
French people erected a monument to Seeger himself and his fellow dead of the Foreign
Legion in 1923 at the other end of the same square.
As symbolic and poetic as it was, Seeger was not the first soldier to be killed for
the Franco-American alliance. That distinction goes to the Chevalier de Saint-Sauveur, a

2

Alan Seeger, “Ode in Memory of the American Volunteers Fallen for France,” Poetry Foundation.

Seeger was by no means alone in discussing this idea of America’s duty to France, see The Great
Crusade: World War I and the Legacy of the American Revolution, American Revolution Institute of the
Society of Cincinnati, Washington, D.C.
3

Alan Seeger, “Ode in Memory of the American Volunteers Fallen for France”; For more information
about those Americans that volunteered to serve in Europe prior to the US’ official involvement, see David
Hanna, Rendezvous with Death: The Americans Who Joined the Foreign Legion in 1914 to Fight for
France and for Civilization (Washington, DC: Regenery History, 2016); Charles Bracelen Flood, First to
Fly: The Story of the Lafayette Escadrille, The American Heroes Who Flew for France in World War I
(New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2015); Arlen J. Hansen, Gentlemen Volunteers: The Story of the
American Ambulance Drivers in the First World War (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2011).
4
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naval officer who died, age 28, in 1778.5 Like Seeger, the Chevalier also has a monument
to his death far from home, and also like Seeger, Saint-Sauveur’s death served as an a
way to renew public memory of the Franco-American alliance during the Great War and
convince the American people of their duty to France. Unlike Seeger, however, who died
at the hands of the German enemy, Saint-Sauveur died at the hands of his supposed ally,
America. What follows is an exploration of the Chevalier de Saint-Sauveur’s influence
on the Franco-American alliance both in 1778 and in the first two decades of the 20th
century. In making this 140-year journey, I will examine why a monument to a dead
French officer sits in front of the Unitarian King’s Chapel in the heart of Boston.6
In the past two centuries of this partnership, there have been periods of diplomatic
strife between the United States and France, but the story of France’s role in the
American Revolution has often served as a unifying force in American public memory.
Recently, historians have explored the French role in the American Revolution in ways
that also extoll the merits of this harmonious partnership, celebrating France’s
contributions to the war effort as America’s “first friend.”7 There has been a tendency to
recall the strength and importance of the Franco-American alliance through a nostalgic
and often roseate lens at moments when it was most useful diplomatically. It is easy to

5

Not much more is known about the Chevalier, not even his full name. It is clear that prior to his military
service he was the first chamberlain of Count d’Artois, the future King Charles X of France.
Christian McBurney, “Why did a Boston Mob Kill a French Officer?” Journal of the American
Revolution, allthingsliberty.com, 23 October 2014.
6

T. Cole Jones, “‘Displaying the Ensigns of Harmony:’ The French Army in Newport, Rhode Island,
1780–1781,” New England Quarterly 85:3 (September 2012) 430-67; Lauren Auricchio, The Marquis:
Lafayette Reconsidered (New York: Vintage, 2015); Larrie D. Ferriero, Brothers at Arms: American
Independence and the Men of France and Spain Who Saved It (New York: Knopf, 2016); McBurney, The
Rhode Island Campaign: The First French and American Operation in the Revolutionary War (New York:
Westholme Publishing, 2011), 230; Tom Shachtman, How the French Saved America: Soldiers, Sailors,
Diplomats, Louis XVI, and the Success of a Revolution (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2017).
7
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celebrate the Marquis de Lafayette, the Statue of Liberty, or the allied victory in both
world wars while dismissing events such the XYZ affair, Vichy France, or freedom fries
as mere siblings’ squabbles. Still, the fact remains that there is more to the FrancoAmerican alliance than a perpetual love affair with Paris and a mutual fondness for
liberty.8
In exploring the circumstances of Saint-Sauveur’s death and the efforts to erect a
monument in his honor, it is not my intention to hold the Franco-American alliance on a
pedestal nor to lambast it, nor do I rest my case with the statement that historical people,
events, and ideas are often more complex and complicated than they first seem. It is
certainly true that the Chevalier’s story is a complicated one. More than that, however, it
demonstrates the ways in which politicians distorted truths and crafted their own
memories of the Franco-American alliance in the wake of the Chevalier’s death.9 There,
they transformed his story from one of colonial Boston’s Francophobic hatred to one of
debt and integrity by dedicating a monument to his honor in Boston. In a sense, both in
the wake of his death in 1778 and in 1917, Bostonian elites twisted the story of the
Chevalier’s death and legacy, teaching Americans the importance of the FrancoAmerican alliance and bringing the two nations closer together.
In the two chapters that follow I will examine the impact of the Chevalier’s death
8

David McCullough, The Greater Journey: Americans in Paris (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011);
Yasmin Sabina Khan, Enlightening the World: The Creation of the Statue of Liberty (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2010); Adam Gopnik, Paris to the Moon (New York: Random House, 2000).
9

Trevor Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American
Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965). As Colbourn argues, it is not the true
history that mattered in shaping historical actors’ decisions as much as their understanding of the history,
regardless of if it is true or not. Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of
Tradition in American Culture (New York: Random House, 1991); David Lowenthal, The Past is a
Foreign Country: Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Roy Rosenzweig and David
Thelen, The Presence of the Past: Popular Used of History in American Life (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1998).
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and story on the larger Franco-American alliance in public memory. In chapter 2, I
explore the controversy surrounding the Chevalier’s death and the identity of his
murderers. Here, the Franco-American leadership in Boston worked to subvert the truth
and avoid allowing the poor officer’s death to become an international incident that
would break the alliance apart almost as soon as it had started. Then in chapter 3, I
explore how Boston’s elite renewed the campaign for a monument for Saint-Sauveur to
demonstrate their allegiance and commitment to the alliance, reminding the citizenry of
their duty to France.
For Bostonians, the idea or promise of the monument was more important than
the edifice itself. It was the pomp and ceremony of unveiling it, rather than the obelisk’s
physical presence on the street, that Americans hoped would convince their fellow
countrymen of the importance of the alliance and re-strengthen their diplomatic ties with
France. As the Boston political order perceived, both during the American Revolution
and in the coming of the Great War, the monument’s purpose was as a piece of
diplomatic theater, reforging the memory of the alliance during a time of political
necessity.10 It was a nice thought that the monument would endure for decades, aging
along with the alliance, but the Boston elites all but washed their hands of Saint-Sauveur
as soon as the ceremony was over. When they pulled the curtain off in the unveiling, they
had achieved their aims for the monument. Just like the disagreeable nature of the

10

John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth
Century (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992). As Bodnar argues, public memorials do not
necessarily reflect a true history as much as they reflect the values of the monument’s creators. Thomas J.
Brown, Civil War Canon: Sites of Confederate Memory in South Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina, 2015); Sanford Levinson, Written in Stone: Public Monuments in Changing Societies
(Durham, Duke University Press, 1998); Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair, and Brian L. Ott, eds., Places of
Public Memory: The Rhetoric of Museums and Memorials (Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press,
2010)

5

Chevalier’s death, which the Bostonians hoped they might move past, the monument too
was made to be forgotten.

6

CHAPTER 2
FAUX PAS IN REVOLUTIONARY BOSTON
On February 6, 1778, the French formally signed the Treaty of Alliance, partnering with
the Americans in the Revolutionary War. Previously, many colonists had only thought of
the French, and of Catholics more generally, as enemies or as untrustworthy papist
agents. Even as news of the alliance and the first French fleet under Admiral Charles
Henri Hector d'Estaing crossed the Atlantic, many Americans were not ready to accept
them with open arms.
The French fleet first arrived at Newport, Rhode Island in August 1778, where
American General James Sullivan hoped d’Estaing could distract the British navy while
he took the city.11 However, the situation soured when a storm surged in the bay and
broke masts on two of d’Estaing’s twelve ships of the line.12 Despite urging from
Sullivan, Nathanael Greene, and the marquis de Lafayette, d’Estaing refused to stay in
Newport and continue with the battle. Instead, the Admiral diverted his entire fleet to
Boston for repairs. In response, Sullivan and his officers send a letter of censure to both
Washington and d’Estaing, stating that the fleet’s flight was “derogatory to the Honor of
11

For full accounts of the siege and the larger Rhode Island campaign, see Thomas Coffin Amory, The
Siege of Newport, August, 1778 (Newport: Newport Historical Publishing Co., 1884); William
Stinchcombe, American Revolution and the French Alliance (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,
1969), 48-57; McBurney, The Rhode Island Campaign: The First French and American Operation in the
Revolutionary War (New York: Westholme Publishing, 2011); Paul F. Dearden, The Rhode Island
Campaign of 1778: Inauspicious Dawn of Alliance (Providence: Rhode Island Publications Society, 1980);
John Ferling, Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence (Oxford; Oxford
University Press, 2007), 274-314.
12

John Sullivan to George Washington, 21 August 1778, Founders Online.
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France… & destructive in the highest Degree to the Welfare of the United States of
America & highly injurious to the Alliance formed between the two Nations.” Moreover,
the American officers challenged the French’s military prowess, stating that sailing to
Boston for repairs was “unwarranted by Precedent & unsupported by Reason.”13 With
tensions already this high, it seemed the only thing holding the Franco-American alliance
together as the fleet docked in Boston was a hope and a prayer, but even that prayer was
controversial.
Since the time of the Glorious Revolution, one historian has argued, anti-Catholic
paranoia was an “ideological glue that held the Anglo-American empire together.”14 This
glue was especially strong in Boston, which, like many other cities in the area, routinely
celebrated Pope’s Day, a colonial equivalent of the English Bonfire Night. Pope’s Day
was an annual occasion in which the lower classes, and sailors especially, aired their
grievances against colonial elites, but it was also overtly anti-Catholic. Celebrants on
Boston’s North and South ends competed to burn both the devil and the Pope in effigy, as
well as occasionally the Stuart monarchs.15
Aside from the annual November 5th festivities, New Englanders were also wary
of interacting with the French more generally. Although they were more than happy to
smuggle goods for sale to French Caribbean colonies and part French merchants from
13

“Protest of Sullivan’s General Officers,” in Sullivan to Washington, 23 August 1778, Founders Online.

14

Owen Stanwood, The Empire Reformed: English America in the Age of the Glorious Revolution
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 178.
15

Francis D. Cogliano, "Deliverance from Luxury: Pope's Day, Conflict and Consensus in Colonial Boston,
1745-1765," Studies in Popular Culture 15:2 (1993): 15–28; Jack Tager, Boston Riots: Three Centuries of
Social Violence (Boston: Northeastern University Press 2001); Brendan McConville, The King's Three
Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776 (Raleigh: University of North Carolina Press,
2006); Gary Nash, The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American
Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).
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their gold, New Englanders in general still had strong memories of the Seven Years
War.16 Regardless of the prior war, Americans, the vast majority of whom were deeply
Protestant, were suspicious of French intentions. Who was to say the French would not
turn their backs on the Americans once the British had lost, reestablishing a Catholic
empire in North America?17 Many Bostonians probably had never even met a French
person, but still had strong prejudices which the alliance would not break overnight.
When d’Estaing’s fleet arrived in late August 1778, they were in dire need of
provisions from their long journey across the Atlantic. The French bought the bulk of
Boston’s supply of flour to feed their ten thousand sailors, which exacerbated the city’s
wartime provisions scarcity. In a letter to her husband, Abigail Adams outlined how the
fleet’s arrival inflated prices in Boston, explaining that “the price of every article scarce
before but now incredibley so…. The cry for Bread is such as I have never heard before.”
To make matters worse, she reported, many people in the area also had dysentery.
Because of the food shortages and the diseases running rampant, Abigail confessed that
“all things look gloomy and melancholy around me.”18
It was in this gloomy and melancholy world that the French fleet established
rudimentary ovens next to their ships to feed the troops, letting the smell of the baking
biscuit waft through the Boston dockyard. The common Bostonians were already
suffering from wartime shortages and were probably resentful of yet another foreign

Frederick Bernays Wiener, “The Rhode Island Merchants and the Sugar Act,” New England Quarterly 3
(July 1930): 468-73; Jones, “Displaying the Ensigns of Harmony,” New England Quarterly 85:3
(September 2012).
16

Thomas S. Kidd, “Recovering ‘The French Convert’: Views of the French and the Uses of AntiCatholicism in Early America,” Book History VII, 2004.
17

18

Abigail Adams to John Adams, 29 September 1778, Founders Online.

9

army occupying their city. On the evening of September 8, 1778 these tensions fomented
a riot when people from the city tried to get bread from a fleet bakery and beat two
French officers, one of whom was the Chevalier de Saint-Sauveur.19 The Chevalier died
on September 15 after complications from his injuries, which forced the alliance’s
leadership to find an explanation for the events on the dockyard and prevent further strife.
The French fleet’s presence made New Englanders confront what they thought
they knew about the French. When the riot broke out, everyone from the Boston city
government, to the state legislature, to d’Estaing and even Washington quickly weighed
in on how to respond. Why would the attack on this one French officer, a man whose full
name never even appeared in historical records, be so important and alarming to the
broader alliance? Dockyard brawls were common not only in Boston, but in almost all
harbor cities at the time. The timing and the participants in the bakery brawl were what
made it so disturbing because the riot, combined with the earlier events at Newport,
seemed to demonstrate New England’s deep-seated Francophobic roots, challenging the
notion that a Franco-American alliance was even possible. If the court at Versailles
learned that the Bostonians were so ungrateful for French aid in the war that they beat a
high-ranking French officer to death over a few loaves of bread, then the FrancoAmerican alliance would be over just weeks after it began.
At first, Boston’s leadership tried to dismiss of the riot’s importance, hoping that
the alliance could just move past its problems (and prejudices) without much discussion.
Bostonians downplayed the whole bread riot incident as unsolvable by not pointing the
“Untitled,” Independent Ledger (Boston, MA), 14 September 1778; For more discussion of food rioting
in Revolutionary America, see Barbara Clark Smith, “Food Rioters and the American Revolution," William
and Mary Quarterly 51:1 (1994): 3-38. Whoever they might have been, the perpetrators of the Boston flour
riot were never caught.
19

10

blame at any one particular person or group. In his correspondence with Washington and
d’Estaing reporting news of the riot and also in his later memoirs, General William Heath
wrote that the fight broke out between French and American sailors.20 Moreover, when
Washington heard the news of the assault, he agreed that the attackers were ordinary
sailors, advising Heath that “All possible means should now be taken to cultivate
harmony between the people and seamen,” and assure the French that no “insult was
intended by the people of the town of Boston.”21 Heath explained to d’Estaing that the
sailors involved in the bread riot might have been from the Marlborough, a privateer ship
docked nearby with British deserters aboard, but the situation was too uncertain to make
any strong claims.22 Rather than accept full responsibility, Heath suggested that sailors
would be sailors and that brawls were not uncommon in any dockyard, let alone
Boston’s. Heath then ordered for guards to be posted near the fleet’s bakery in order to
prevent further confrontations, and the Massachusetts State Council restricted people
from being out at night altogether, putting a curfew in place.23 If it was not enough to ask
the people of Boston to behave nicely, the State Council and Heath ensured good
behavior by preventing people from getting into situations where a brawl or argument
might occur.

20

William Heath to Washington, 10 September 1778, Founders Online; Heath to Jean Baptiste Charles
Henri Hector, comte d’Estaing, 9 September 1778, in The Heath Papers, vol. 2 (Boston: Massachusetts
Historical Society, 1904) 268; William Heath, Heath’s Memoirs of the American War, ed. Rufus Rockwell
Wilson (New York: A Wessels Company, 1904) 206.
21

Washington, to Heath, 22 September 1778, Founders Online.

22

Fitz-Henry Smith, Jr., The French at Boston During the American Revolution with Particular Reference
to the French Fleets and the Fortifications in the Harbor (Boston, T.R. Marvin & Son, 1913) 37.
Smith, The French at Boston, 43-44; Benjamin David Vine, “For the Peace of the Town: Boston’s
Politics in the American Revolution, 1776-1787,” (PhD Thesis, University of Sydney, 2018) 167-68.
23
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D’Estaing was an active partner in diplomatic deception, and in order to resolve
tensions in the aftermath of the bread riot, the admiral ironically escalated matters in his
reply to Heath, crafting a new story instead of just omitting the true one. He went further
and proposed an alternative history, suggesting that instead of hungry American sailors,
British saboteurs had started the riot. The Marlborough held captured British soldiers on
board, and d’Estaing used them as scapegoats, arguing that they were undoubtably the
ones to incite the riot in order to create diplomatic strife. Then, conveniently, these agents
provocateurs fled the scene, never to be seen again. If the court at Versailles learned the
truth, then d’Estaing might get orders to return home, dashing his chances of upgrading
his prospects through military prowess. In a letter to Heath after the riot, d’Estaing wrote,
“our common enemies will learn that neither unforeseen misfortunes nor their plots”
could ever challenge the strength of the Franco-American alliance.24 While his cover-up
assured the Americans that the French would not seek retribution, it also helped him
control his own men and prevent further strife or resentment.
In contrast to Heath’s initial response after the bread riot that sailors would be
sailors, Saint-Sauveur’s death meant that the alliance’s leadership then resolved to keep
the true story of the dockyard riot a secret. General Nathanael Greene’s communication
with Washington after Saint-Sauveur died echoed d’Estaing’s diplomatic and vague
alternative story that removed Americans from the riot’s narrative entirely. In the new
version of events, Greene explained that “British officers in the neighbourhood of this
place are endeavorg to sow the seeds of discord.”25 In just a matter of days the story had
D’Estaing to Heath, 10 September 1778, in Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Series 7,
Volume 4, Trans. Amanda Shearer (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1904) 269-70.
24

25

Nathanael Greene to Washington, 16 September 1778, Founders Online.
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transformed from a benign misunderstanding, to the possibility of British interference, to
an all-out conspiracy. By placing the blame on these shadowy British agents as d’Estaing
had suggested, Greene and the American leadership tried to tell the French that true
Bostonians had nothing but respect for their French counterparts.26 Still, some French
officers at the time did write that Americans, not British agents, carried out the riot.27
While d’Estaing was trying to quell unrest in his officer corps, Greene and his
counterparts were trying to quell further unrest in the whole city. Greene’s story said that
Americans would never dare risk upsetting the French, let alone engage in a nighttime
brawl with their new allies. The French troops, whether they believed the story or simply
accepted the excuse, also moved on from Saint-Sauveur’s death. Glad that the French
were satisfied, Greene assured Washington that the news of Tory saboteurs “fills [the
French] with double resentment against the British.”28 By absolving Americans of any
wrongdoing on paper, the city’s leadership strengthened the alliance through a shared
hatred of a common enemy while also educating Bostonians as to proper behavior.
For all the justified outrage the Franco-American leadership felt at SaintSauveur’s death, his funeral was not a grand affair. While there were no further major
26

Still, historians today generally agree that it was Bostonians, not foreign saboteurs, who started the riot
and killed Saint-Sauveur. See: Smith, The French at Boston, 36; Stinchcombe, The American Revolution
and the French Alliance, 58-9; Michael Donnay, “The ‘French-Bread Riot’ of 8 September 1778: The
French Fleet and Boston’s Food Supply,” paper presented at McMullen Naval History Symposium, U.S.
Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, 17 September 2015, 20; McBurney, “Why did a Boston Mob Kill a
French Officer?” Journal of the American Revolution; Officer in the Late Army, A Complete History of the
Marquis de Lafayette, Major-general in the American Army in the War of the Revolution: Embracing an
Account of His Tour Through the United States, to the Time of His Departure, September, 1825 (Hartford:
S. Andrus & Sons: 1846) 71; Victomte Amblard-Marie-Raymond-Amédéede Noailles, Marins et Soldats
Français en Amérique Pendant la Guerre de L'indépendance des États-Unis (1778-1783) (Paris: Libraire
Académique Didier Perrin et Cie, 1903) 46.
“Extract of a letter from Comte de Breugnon, Oct. 10, 1778,” in B.F. Stevens, ed., Facsimiles of
Manuscripts in European Archives Relating to America 1773-1783 (London: Whittingham & Co., 1895),
23.
27

28

Greene to Washington, 16 September 1778, Founders Online.
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acts of aggression against the French, the French were still fearful of Bostonian
antagonisms. They decided against a public ceremony and funeral for Saint-Sauveur,
opting instead for a private, nighttime ceremony in the Stranger’s Tomb at King’s
Chapel. 29 After the funeral, there was no marker for Saint-Sauveur’s grave, and no record
of his internment.30 Moreover, though King’s Chapel was a church, it was certainly not
the Catholic one Saint-Sauveur might have hoped for. Even more, the chapel’s loyalist
congregation had fled the church in 1776, meaning that Bostonians had placed the officer
in what was essentially the pauper’s tomb of an abandoned church.31
Prior to the funeral, at the urging of Heath, Greene and Washington, the
Massachusetts Bay Assembly voted soon after the Chevalier’s death to “attend in
Procession the Corps of the deceased to the Place of Interment” and “provide a
monumental Stone to be placed in the burial Ground where his Remains shall be
deposited, with such inscription as his Excellency the Count d'Estaing shall order.”32 The
resolve seemed to assume that he would be placed in a burial ground, but made no
specific provision on where he would be buried or what the stone would look like. There
was not even any clear knowledge of whether Saint-Sauveur would be buried in Boston

The records do not state who, whether French or American, chose the Chevalier’s burial site. For
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or home in France. Moreover, the two records mentioning Saint-Sauveur’s interment that
survive are French in origin, as if the Americans never even bothered to write it down.33
Nevertheless, at the state government’s behest, d’Estaing drafted an inscription.
Instead of dwelling on how the Bostonians had treated the French fleet unfairly,
d’Estaing tried to help the Americans understand the French perspective on the alliance
using the memorial. Just as memorials to American war dead such as Bostonian Joseph
Warren helped to cement American identity and unity, d’Estaing hoped the Chevalier’s
monument might unite the French and Americans.34 In his monument inscription,
d’Estaing declared, “After having had the glory of risking his life for the United States,
[Saint-Sauveur] became in the performance of his duty the victim of a tumult caused by
the evil minded.”35 D’Estaing’s purposely cryptic statement allowed the plaque to have
multiple meanings. Either it cursed the British for inciting the riot, or it was a subtle jab
that admonished the anti-French sentiment prevalent amongst American Bostonians.
D’Estaing allowed for the possibility that Saint-Sauveur came to the New World to fight
for the American cause, only for those very Americans to be his downfall. Further down
on the plaque design, he wrote, “Dying with the same devotion to America, the ties of
duty and sympathy which bind his compatriots to the City of Boston have thus been
drawn tighter. May all efforts to separate France and American end thus.”36 From one
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perspective, the plaque condemned British saboteurs for instigating the riot and causing
strife in the alliance. Alternatively, it was also a reminder that any further anti-French
sentiment was irrational. He also distributed copies of his proposed inscription to the
French fleet so that they would be aware of the Americans’ peaceful gesture, using the
memorial as a symbol to quell any further Franco-American disagreements and
strengthen diplomatic ties in a time of war.37
Much as d’Estaing saw the Chevalier’s death as a teachable moment for the
alliance, Bostonians used the Saint-Sauveur incident to remind their neighbors who the
true enemy was. Although the French fleet’s arrival in 1778 exacerbated the food
shortage, and many townsfolk felt uneasy having a Catholic fleet moored on their
dockyards, the Independent Ledger reminded Bostonians that their grievances with the
British eight years prior had been much worse. The newspaper contrasted the bread riot
to the Boston Massacre, explaining that the British, “coming from what we formerly
regarded as our mother country… in a wanton and butcherly way fired upon the
inhabitants of Boston without any just provocation.” In contrast, the French, “our allies
and protectors, when assaulted themselves by unknown ruffians, have left their protection
and satisfaction entirely within the hands of the civilian magistrate.”38 Using such a
comparison, the newspaper urged Bostonians to remember who their real friends were.
The French fleet treated the Bostonians with civility, and the press, by foregrounding the
Chevalier’s death, reminded the city that their allies deserved the same civility and
respect in return.
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As the fleet prepared to sail for the West Indies, the American leadership in
Boston was concerned that the French might not leave soon enough. The French had
plans to leave in early November, but November 5 was Pope’s Day. Knowing that the
French would be incensed to see their new allies burning effigies of the pope in the
streets of Boston, the Massachusetts State Council banned the holiday that year.39 In the
end, the fragile Franco-American alliance was able to avert yet another diplomatic
incident when d’Estaing’s fleet left Boston on November 4, just one day before the
festivities were supposed to start.
As d’Estaing’s fleet embarked for warmer waters later that month, Patriot
leadership knew that they did not need to follow through on the promised monument
once the tension inside the nascent alliance had faded. Americans promised that their new
alliance was now unshakable, but it seems more likely that, rather than change their
sentiment, the riot taught the Bostonians a lesson in diplomacy. The Bostonians simply
had learned to quiet their criticism of the French and restrict their behavior in the streets
for the sake of the larger alliance. As d’Estaing and his men sailed away, so did the sense
of urgency General Heath, Greene and their men felt in trying to assuage hurt feelings
and convince townspeople of the importance of cooperating with the French. When the
fleet left for the West Indies in November of 1778, it became clear that Massachusetts’s
promise of erecting a monument was an empty one, with no one in the legislature
seeming to ever discuss the matter again.40 Teaching Bostonians to hide their antiCatholic sentiment when Frenchmen were not around was like learning the language of a
“Order of the State Council to Justices of the Peace and Selectmen of Boston,” 4 November 1778, Boston
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country one never intended to travel to. Saint-Sauveur’s hushed and unpublicized burial,
along with the fact that the Americans forgot about the monument indicates that the
Americans were somewhat disingenuous in their promises. For the Massachusetts state
officials, who saw the monument as a way to appease the French officer’s sense of honor
and to remind Bostonians to behave themselves, the mere promise of a monument was
more than enough to keep the Franco-American alliance out of peril.
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CHAPTER 3
SAINT-SAUVEUR’S RENDEZVOUS WITH DEATH
In October 1886, French and Americans assembled for the dedication of the
Statue of Liberty in New York’s harbor. Although many people today conceive of the
monument as a symbol of American and France’s mutual love of liberty or America’s
commitment to be a land of immigrants, the pretext behind the Statue was more
complicated. New York, let alone America, was not the designers’ first choice for their
statue’s location, and though onlookers molded the state into a symbol of the old alliance,
some of the involved Frenchmen had other ideas in mind. Some hoped the statue would
spur investment in the uncompleted Panama Canal, others saw it as a symbol of “colonial
domination.” Whatever their motives were, one historian has argued that though the
statue’s dedication demonstrated a moment of contact between the French and
Americans, it was a false or at least disingenuous one.41 Similarly, as demonstrated in the
following chapter, though early twentieth Bostonians celebrated the Chevalier monument
as a symbol of America’s commitment to France, it also had the added benefit of spurring
America to war.
After d’Estaing’s fleet sailed for warmer shores in autumn of 1778, the next time
that Boston reinvestigated the matter of a monument for the Chevalier was in 1905, when
area historically-minded fraternal organizations brought the matter before the

41

Francesca Lidia Viano, Sentinel: The Unlikely Origins of the Statue of Liberty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2018).

19

Massachusetts state legislature. The French Society for the Sons of the American
Revolution initiated the renewed interest in Saint-Sauveur and his monument. A chapter
of about thirty men centered in Paris, the French Society was made up of both Americanborn and French gentlemen who were descended from soldiers and sailors who had
served in the American Revolution. The society’s registrar, Colonel Charles Chaille
Long, embarked on a project in 1902 to compile a list of all the French participants in the
American Revolution, hoping to use genealogies to increase the society’s membership.42
Coming across d’Estaing’s proposed plaque inscription in French archives a few
years later, Long wrote to Albert Alonzo Folsom, a member of the Massachusetts
Chapter of the Sons of the American Revolution (SAR), to enquire as to the location of
the Chevalier’s Memorial.43 Long’s request sent Folsom, a retired railroad magnate and
prominent gentleman in many of Boston’s historical societies, scrambling. Searching the
many cemeteries in around Boston, Folsom was unable to find any such monument.
Mortified that the early state legislature had reneged on its promise from so long ago,
Folsom asked his state senator to approach the state legislature, demanding that
“appropriate action be taken to carry into effect, at least in spirit,” to finish what the
colony had promised in 1778.44
When the Folsom’s petition went through the legislature, politicians with interests
in local history and France sat on the monument committee, demonstrating that attention
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to the initiative was still quite esoteric. Among those on the committee was Hugo
Adelard Dubuque, “a leading representative of French-Canadians in New England” and a
member of the militantly French nationalist and anti-Dreyfusard Ligue des Patriotes.45
Also there were two members of the state’s chapter of the Sons of the American
Revolution and an officer of the state’s chapter of the (similar sounding but distinct) Sons
of the Revolution, two elite historical societies.46 In 1905, the men on the legislative
committee combed through archives, trying to find any reference to the Chevalier and
d’Estaing’s time in Boston. Ultimately, the committee resolved that the state fulfill the
General Court of Massachusetts Bay’s promise and erect a monument in King’s Chapel
courtyard, given that one of the chapel’s tombs was the Chevalier’s last known resting
place, at the cost of $3,000. In the accompanying report of the committee, they argued
that the state was culpable in Saint-Sauveur’s death because it had “failed in its primal
duty to keep the public peace.” Goaded perhaps by a sense of duty or honor, they
concluded simply that “in war and in peace, Massachusetts keeps her promises.”47
Although the majority of the committee was enthusiastic about the monument
initiative, it was still difficult for the resolve to gain traction outside of this small
historically minded audience. Among the general populace, most common Bostonians did
not really have an opinion of the French; there were limited historical memories of the
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Revolutionary alliance or many celebrations of French culture. Instead, if they associated
the French with anything at all in 1905 and 1906, they probably conceived of FrenchCanadians, who came to New England in droves to work in the region’s many textile
mills and factories.48 Even many of Boston’s elite Brahmin families were not particularly
interested in French culture. It wasn’t until 1911 that the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston
first exhibited French impressionist painter Claude Monet’s works.49 Other Brahmins
considered Boston socialite and art patron Isabella Stewart Gardener a renegade for her
support of classical French compositions when German compositions were in vogue on
Beacon Hill.50
As the committee’s resolution went through the legislature the following year, it
seems that many politicians, like the people at large, were less enthusiastic about keeping
reviving the public memory of France’s assistance and celebrating their French
connections. The Joint Committee on Ways and Means cut the funding recommendation
in half, down to $1,500.51 In June 1906, when the entire resolve finally passed in both
chambers, legislators authorized the monument but did not appropriate money in the
budget for its construction. The lack of appropriations indicated that though the majority
of the committee thought the matter was important, the entire initiative was not a
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particularly high priority for the legislature as a whole.52 Although the lack of funding
was frustrating, Folsom and his connections in the Sons of the American Revolution
could have easily brought the matter before the legislature yet again the following year;
however, when Folsom fell ill and died in 1907, no one else stepped up to lead the charge
for the monument and the bill foundered. With no war or pressing concern, Americans
did not feel compelled to celebrate or even acknowledge the old Franco-American
alliance of 1778. Rather than the monument being a patriotic and diplomatic public
relations opportunity, the legislature saw it as the SAR’s pet project and were not
impelled to follow through on the matter.
Especially telling was the 1906 minority opinion of the Senate monument
committee, which was written by none other than Arthur T. Lyman, the senior warden at
King’s Chapel, where the state was proposing the obelisk be placed. Lyman, although
part of a distinguished Bostonian family, seemed less interested in sharing the
Chevalier’s history. He argued that the Chevalier’s murder had little to do with the
Franco-American alliance. Instead, Saint-Sauveur had died in “merely a street fight
without any political character.”53 Furthermore, as he saw it, the colony’s concerns over
maintaining the alliance after the Chevalier’s death were an overreaction. Rather than
seeing d’Estaing as an equal partner is smoothing over tensions for the sake of
diplomacy, Lyman took the count’s words at face value, stating that the fleet had no ill
feelings toward the Americans. Lyman, whom the sitting Minister of King’s Chapel
would later praise in his memoirs as “the gentlelest of tyrants” and the “ideal… manager
52
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of church interest,” argued that if d’Estaing was willing to sail off without seeing the
monument through to its completion, then he must not have been too concerned about the
entire affair.54 Lyman concluded by stating that it was perhaps “the unimportance of the
matter… caused the erection of a monument to be forgotten or given up, and it seems
quite unnecessary at this late day to stir up this unimportant incident, or… to put up a
monument which the Colonial Government in a moment of excitement and apprehension
had agreed to erect.”55
Why might Arthur Lyman, a man from a distinguished Brahmin family who ran
in the same elite circles as his fellow committee members, oppose the monument so
strongly? It seems that there was more to his dismissal than simply taking d’Estaing at his
word that the fleet had forgiven the colonial Bostonians. Although Lyman was a warden
for King’s Chapel, he might have seen the monument as opposing church interests.
Perhaps, Lyman simply was not interested in what he might have seen as the church’s
prehistory, given that King’s had been a Unitarian congregation since 1785.
Alternatively, maybe he thought that renewed discussion of the Chevalier’s death might
cast a shadow on the church’s history of the American Revolution, when it stood largely
unused after its loyalist Anglican congregation fled the city in 1776.56 Moreover, even
though Saint-Sauveur was buried at the chapel, he was not a member of the church. All
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other monuments in the church at that time were to church members, and perhaps Lyman
was resentful of the idea of the state government appropriating his church’s front portico
for their monument, just as the Massachusetts Bay Council had seemingly appropriated
the chapel’s tomb for the Chevalier’s burial.57
Lyman’s views were of the minority, but it is nevertheless telling that some
people so closely related to the monument effort still felt that the entire initiative was an
overreaction or an unnecessary distraction. There was no impetus to ensure that those
who supported the monument saw it through to its completion, with the committee
dropping the matter during the summer legislative break only to forget about it. Although
they disagreed with Lyman, through their inaction they supported his perspective. It is
perhaps fitting that it was only ten years later when Lyman died that Boston experienced
another “moment of excitement and apprehension.” 58
In 1915, a year after the Great War started, Boston’s local historians again
became interested in the Franco-American monument, even though there was still no
clear sign that the United States would ever formally join the war. The state legislature
considered the Chevalier’s case again when Fitz-Henry Smith, a noted maritime lawyer
and state representative, submitted a petition. Among the many candidates capable of
petitioning for a monument, Smith was perhaps the best suited man in all of Boston. Not
only was he a lawyer, but Smith was also a historian and an active member of the
Bostonian Society, a local historical organization full of elites from Boston Brahmin
families that regularly supported similar initiatives. Moreover, Smith had written a book
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in 1913 titled The French at Boston During the American Revolution, which examined
the activities of d’Estaing’s 1778 fleet in Boston at length. In it, Smith devoted
considerable space to the Chevalier’s death, arguing that it was Americans, not the
British, who had killed him.59
As the monument proposal went through the committee rounds for the second
time, legislators stalled the bill again over the matter of appropriations, not feeling any
patriotic or diplomatic obligation to see the colony’s promise through. Even in May 1916,
the appointed architect and Bostonian Society member A. W. Longfellow wrote to the J.
Randolph Coolidge, the new King’s Chapel representative on the legislative committee,
that “The idea of a monument seems to be out of the question on account of cost.”
Longfellow, who had previously designed such buildings as Cambridge’s City Hall and
Harvard’s Brattle Theatre, suggested that the best the legislature might approve would be
a tasteful plaque inlaid on the left exterior wall of the church near the rear.60 The state
house finally passed an appropriations bill later that year in June 1916, allowing for a
memorial obelisk to be placed at the front of King’s Chapel’s courtyard facing Tremont
Street. They suggested that the monument’s design suggest that is was of the period of
the Chevalier’s death, as if it had been competed in 1778 as originally promised. When
Smith had initially petitioned for the monument, the legislature initially recommended
just $500, only to compromise and finally officially appropriate $1000, just one third of
what they had proposed eleven years earlier.61 Still, construction stalled in December of
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that year when construction workers cracked the granite base as they were installing the
monument, and it was possible that at this point the committee lobbied the state for an
additional $400 for repairs.62
As the bill made its way through the legislature that year, Boston, Massachusetts,
and the United States in general were going through dramatic changes as the possibility
of war approached. The growing tensions of becoming a wartime city would come to
define the Saint-Sauveur monument as a tangible connection between the FrancoAmerican alliance of 1778 and the Allies of the Great War. Indeed, had the Chevalier de
Saint-Sauveur been there to witness the monument’s unveiling in 1917, many of the ideas
that were swirling around the city would have felt familiar to him. Here were Bostonians
that, while not under siege themselves, were anxious and burdened by escalating military
tensions. Many working-class Bostonians of the 20th century, much like their 18th
century counterparts, still held animosity in their hearts for the British, not because of a
memory of colonial taxes, but because they were from Irish immigrant families.63 In fact,
over 9,000 protesters assembled in Boston in the summer of 1916 to show their support
for the victims of Ireland’s Easter Rising, in which the British Army crushed rebels and
civilians that had tried to establish an independent Irish Republic. So incensed were these
people with the British that many protesters in the assembled crowd reportedly cheered at
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the prospect of Germany routing the Allies.64 It was partly this virulently anti-British
portion of Boston’s populace that made state and local officials so focused on
emphasizing the Franco-American alliance specifically as the United States joined the
war.
Moreover, much like the witnesses of the deadly bread riot of 1778, Bostonians in
the 1910s were also acquainted with the violent culture of the Boston dockyards. Even
though the Revolutionary-Era monument proposal sanctioned dockyard violence,
Bostonians had not yet learned their lesson. In 1915, over 20,000 Italian immigrants
paraded to Boston’s Commonwealth Pier to see off 1,400 Italian Reservists, eager to sail
to Europe and help their home country when it joined the Allies in the war. The peaceful
parade broke out into a riot when the Italians encountered two interned German liners.65
Although this riot was not deadly, it nevertheless indicates that twentieth century
Bostonians were no strangers to mob violence.
In a sharp contrast to their icy disinterest in France in 1905, the Bostonians of the
early Great War period were more accepting of French culture, buying into the idea that
Americans owed France a debt from the American Revolution. Newspapers regularly
made reference to the symbolic debt and ran many announcements urging readers to
subscribe to French war relief charities. Throughout 1916, the Boston chapter of the
Women’s Lafayette War Relief Fund advertised their regular benefit concerts and
donation drives “to relieve the sufferings and hardships of the French soldiers in the
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trenches.”66 Similarly, the Boston chapter of the American Society for the Relief of
French War Orphans urged readers to donate their money or time and alleviate the “debt
America has long owed the French people.” Although the Great War was still not
America’s to fight, Bostonians still ought to “make some return for the SERVICES and
SACRIFICES of the FRANCE of LAFAYETTE and ROCHAMBEAU at the time of the
American Revolution WHEN AMERICA NEEDED HELP.”67 It was only in this new
pro-French climate with ideas about wartime honor and historical debt that there was
enough momentum to propel the Chevalier’s long-promised monument into existence.
As the possibility of American intervention became a reality in late 1916 and
early 1917, many of Boston’s most popular newspapers followed national trends in
denigrating the Germans. Much as Boston journalists had embarked on a public relations
campaign after Saint-Sauveur’s death to explain to Americans that the British were their
true enemy, they did the same in 1916-17, only this time focusing their derision on the
Germans. Although journalists acknowledged some shortcomings of the Allies, they
reminded their readers that the Central Powers were much worse. Like the anti-British
rhetoric of 1778, the anti-German rhetoric of this era also isolated one recent incident to
remind readers that the US could do worse than allying with the French. In the weeks
leading to June 5th, 1917, the official registration day for the draft, the press took the
opportunity to remind their readers to remember how German U-boats sunk the
Lusitania, a British passenger ship with more than 128 Americans on board just two
years earlier. The week of the monument’s dedication, Evening Transcript reprinted
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excerpts of fiery and patriotic sermons from the American Unitarian Association’s
(AMA) meeting, held, in part, in King’s Chapel. Reverend Samuel Eliot preached about
the necessity of declaring war against Germany, “aggressive autocracy that tears up
treaties as mere scraps of paper, that tramples on the weak, that inflicts upon the innocent
the miseries of invasion and devastation.”68 Germany, one speaker declared, had “deep
damnation seated in the principles by which it acts.” It was only in such an immoral and
autocratic society as Germany that government leaders would approve of the attack on
the Lusitania, where “the indiscriminate murder of women and children upon the seas is
right because the king wills it and the chancellor demands it.”69
Instead of celebrating the controversial British, newspapers and speakers,
attentive to their ethnically Irish demographic, focused on the French instead. The AMA
speakers also took time to praise the upstanding aspects of French morality and culture.
Whereas Germany was a temple of unquestioning and self-serving autocracy, one speaker
noted that France’s national motto, “Liberté, Equalité, Fraternité,” was indeed practically
a reality in their corner of Europe, and moreover that the French deserved credit for their
role during the Revolution.70 Another journalist, in an article titled, “Vive La France,”
explained that unlike Germany, France had always been courteous in their diplomacy. He
explained, somewhat erroneously, that Great Britain had offered the new United States to
France at the end of the Revolution, but instead France was the first nation to recognize
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American independence and affirm their alliance.71 Over a century apart, in both cases,
the press reminded readers that France was a worthy ally by juxtaposing French
magnanimity and virtues against those of the enemy’s past abuses against Bostonians and
Americans more generally.
Finally, in May 1917, as war loomed closer, a month after America’s official
declaration of war and two weeks before draft day, Massachusetts displayed the
memorial in the early days of a new Franco-American alliance. Bostonians saw the
monument dedication as a way to commemorate publicly their patriotism and zeal for
France in the weeks and months ahead. Perhaps most telling that Bostonians directly tied
the Chevalier’s obelisk to their current military crisis was the state auditor’s report for
1918, which filed the additional $400 needed for repairs to the monument base in
December of 1916 as specifically war expenses.72
On May 24th, almost 140 years after they promised, the state of Massachusetts
unveiled a monument to the Chevalier de Saint-Sauveur in an occasion replete with pomp
and ceremony. Several leading politicians of the day, including Governor Samuel
McCall, Lieutenant Governor Calvin Coolidge, Mayor James Michael Curley, and the
legislative monument committee of 1916 assembled at the State House and paraded to
King’s Chapel for the unveiling.73 Led by sailors from the USS Virginia and area
militiamen, the parade procession carried French and American flags, as well as the flags
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Figure 3.1 Saint-Sauveur Monument
of many local historical societies while buglers announced their march.74 Although many
local newspapers recounted the grand parade, in reality the route was the equivalent of
two and a half city blocks.75 Still, in crafting a ceremony that invited all Bostonians into
what had been previously a Brahmin campaign for a monument, local politicians hoped
to craft a collective memory of the importance of the Franco-American alliance, not just
in the past, but also in the present. After the brief procession, the politicians took turns
giving speeches and posing for photographs. As Governor McCall pulled the cover off
the monument, he exclaimed that the monument “serves to mark the love we have for
France,” while Courtenay Guild, the head of the building commission added the
sentiment that their hard work “‘not only represents a memorial to a gallant officer but in
74
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Figure 3.2 Speakers at the monument unveiling, from right to left:
Representative Fitz-Henry Smith Jr., Governor Samuel McCall,
Major Paul Azan, Lt. Governor Calvin Coolidge, and members of
the monument committee.
the hearts and minds of the people typifies their admiration for what France is doing for
the cause of civilization.’”76 Throughout the demonstration, the speakers repeatedly drew
parallels between the Franco-American alliance of 1778 and 1917, ignoring the awkward
reality of the Chevalier’s death.
As it came time to dedicate the monument outside King’s Chapel, Boston
officials, when telling the assembled crowd the circumstances surrounding SaintSauveur’s death, again, just as they had done 138 years earlier, engaged in myth making.
They crafted a new story about the Chevalier’s death that would work to their diplomatic
advantage during the monument unveiling. Like a decades long game of telephone, the
76
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story of who had actually killed Saint-Sauveur morphed again. The first to speak about
the Chevalier in particular was local historian, Bostonian Society member, and state
representative Fitz-Henry Smith. He vaguely told the crowd that the during the time of
the bread riot, “there were British sympathizers and disoriented persons” in the
dockyards. Still Smith himself knew the truth, that d’Estaing was the first to cover up the
incident by blaming the British, as he argued in his book about the French fleet’s time in
New England published four years earlier.77 Whether Smith decided it would be prudent
to remain vague or someone else at the ceremony recommended that he keep up the
charade is unclear. Either way, it is evident that the Americans valued the monument in
helping to remind people of the Franco-American alliance rather than remembering what
had almost torn it apart in the past.
Although all these myths about the Chevalier’s murderers served to minimize
division within the alliance, the final myth that a speaker proposed at the monument
unveiling was perhaps the strangest one of all. Major Paul Azan, a French officer
stationed at Harvard to help train the young men for the coming war, spoke in the
absence of the French ambassador, who cancelled at the last minute. He spoke in French,
but then a Harvard English professor then translated Azan’s remarks for the assembled
crowd. The newest in a long history of lies, Azan’s fabrication suggested that Americans,
and indeed Boston Patriots, had killed the Chevalier, but only “because by some blunder
of their own, the mob fancied him to be British.”78 Azan also pointed out that although
they had been at war with the British during the Revolution, the three nations were all
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fighting for good alongside each other in WWI. Azan’s posturing of welcoming the
British into the alliance reinforced the idea that the Americans and the French had already
had a strong bond since the nation’s founding. As Azan saw it, the alliance was older and
stronger than America’s with Britain, a message that would have proved particularly
popular in an Irish Catholic enclave like Boston. In the end, regardless of who it was that
killed the Chevalier, whether the murder was deliberate or accidental, what mattered less
was the facts and more was how the monument and the story of it could help Americans
create a sense of public memory of the historic alliance.
After the crowd dissipated and the flowers scattered around the plinth wilted, the
monument faded into obscurity; however, the monument itself did not matter as much as
the diplomatic value of its unveiling, as seen in the design of the monument itself. While
certainly not intentional, the monument is designed in such a way that diminishes its
visibility and accessibility. Situated under the King’s Chapel front portico, it occupies an
important space at the building’s entrance. However, because of the tall wrought iron
security fence surrounding the property’s perimeter that was installed long before the
monument, it is difficult to see clearly from the street, as visitors must hug the fence and
peer through. Moreover, even if one were to enter the gate, the monument is so close to
the street that it is hard to get a clear view of its front. Moreover, likely because of costsaving measures, the monument’s main inscription is entirely in French with no
translation, meaning that the vast majority of Boston’s population, both in 1917 and
today, would have little understanding of the monument’s importance if not aware of the
unveiling ceremony. Consequently, the monument’s importance ended as it was unveiled
because the monument’s design inhibited much further interaction. Though this failure of
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design is unfortunate, it demonstrates yet again that the monument committee’s priorities
were on the patriotic act of acknowledging their historical debt, reviving the memory of
the old alliance, and celebrating the French rather than on the physical edifice itself.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
June 1, 1917 was a splendid summer day to be outside, and Bostonians gathered on the
Boston Common for a patriotic concert. There in the shadow of the gold-topped State
House, the public waved flags and listened to the band’s rendition of the “Star-Spangled
Banner” during their noon lunch hour. It was the weekend before the official draft
registration day and the Bostonians, full of patriotic fervor and anxious with anticipation
for their involvement in the war, respectfully doffed their caps and sang along with the
band. After a wave of applause, the band picked up again, now playing “La Marseillaise,”
the French national anthem, as the crowd respectfully kept their heads uncovered and
listened with attention. Bostonians were Bostonians, however, and it was not long before
the concert stopped short when a fight broke out and a mob formed.
The cause of the disturbance? It was not a flour shortage, but it did have to do
with the French. According to a later newspaper report, over 100 members of the crowd
seized one of the concert attendees when he donned his hat in the middle of “La
Marseillaise.” “Throw that man out of the crowd!” one officer shouted, as a few men
grabbed him and began to beat him, trampling his hat. The jingoistic crowd then carried
the offending man off to the police station, accompanied by mounted officers. On their
route there, the mob paraded their victim up Tremont Street and would have turned right
onto School Street, seeing the new monument to the Chevalier de Saint-Sauveur on their
fervent march towards justice. The police detained the man, but after some investigation
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released him when they found he had already signed up for service in the upcoming war,
dismissing the entire incident as a misunderstanding.79
One hundred and thirty-nine years after a French man was a victim of Boston’s
mob violence, an American man too became a victim when he failed to show the
necessary respect to the French. Instead of acting out of a mixture of hunger, paranoia,
and francophobia, the mob of 1917 acted out of a fervid support for France and the
Franco-American alliance more broadly. It would have been inconceivable for the Pope’s
Day-loving Bostonians of d’Estaing’s time to even witness such a French anthem being
played. Now in the early days of American involvement in the Great War, Bostonians
themselves played it openly and proudly. The Chevalier de Saint-Sauveur’s story and
monument had a role to play in that dramatic ideological transformation.
Even before Saint-Sauveur was in the tomb, Patriot leadership American and
French alike quickly went to work in transforming the story of his death from one of antiCatholic sentiment into one that demonstrated the urgency for unity and cohesion. Their
lies and vagueness obscured the fact that Boston’s citizens, the very people the Chevalier
had crossed the ocean to protect, killed him. Instead, through the help of Heath, Greene,
Washington, and d’Estaing, his death became a teachable moment, demonstrating the
fragility of the alliance and the importance of cooperation on both martial and civic
levels. In promising a monument, the Massachusetts Bay Council hoped to remind their
citizens that public francophobic sentiment was unacceptable.
By the time of the Great War, the monument’s purpose had in some ways
transformed. No longer meant just to tell Bostonians that they should not oppose the
“Volunteer is Victim of Mob Error: Crowd at Common Concert Pursued Victim to Police Station,”
Boston Morning Journal 2 June, 1917, pg. 4.
79
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French, the speakers at the monument’s dedication expressed their hope that the obelisk
could help show Bostonians not just to tolerate the French, but to love them. Still it was
not as much the accuracy of their story that they cared about, but the utility of it. The
monument’s construction and unveiling became a way for Boston elite to demonstrate
their dedication to fulfilling America’s historical debt to France and acknowledge the
importance of the Franco-American alliance.
Ultimately, both in 1778 and 1917, Boston’s leadership was able to thwart and
prevent a potential international embarrassment by tweaking the story of the Chevalier’s
death and using it to their advantage in strengthening the Franco-American alliance rather
than diminishing it. For the Revolutionary elite, a monument was not even necessary. All
they had to do was pacify the town long enough for the French fleet to sail out to sea
again—afterwards they forgot about the matter altogether. In 1917 the Boston elite did
much of the same, concocting a story to win American support, only to forget about it
soon after. The Chevalier, as a martyr for the cause, could finally go to rest having served
his purpose.
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